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STRIKING EVENTS OF THE FAR EAST

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I. THE NEW RÉGIME IN CHINA

The death of the late president, Yuan Shih-kai, after he had formally abandoned the movement for a monarchy, but before he had yielded to the demand of many of the people that he resign from the presidency, has been succeeded by many serious problems of state and also by an increasing spirit of confidence and hopefulness. The premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, had been an old friend of the deceased president, but had refused to join the monarchical movement, even with Yuan Shih-kai as emperor. He thus served as a most fitting medium between the *régime* of Yuan and the new Republican *régime*. He had become premier under Yuan the last few weeks, and was practically the chief in the few days of transition. Being a military man, he was able to hold in check any mutiny of the troops. Being opposed to the monarchical movement, he commanded the respect of the faction which wanted a republic. Being one of the older officials, having held office even under the Manchus, he commanded the respect of the more conservative element in the country. The preservation of order in the capital rested on Premier Tuan Chi-jui.

Through the personal influence of the premier, united with that of the former premier, Hsü Shih-chang, the vice-president, Li Yuan-hung, was induced to accept the duties of president, in accordance with all the forms of constitution. He had held out to the end against the monarchical

movement, even to the danger of his life. He had also said that he was no longer vice-president since Yuan Shih-kai had allowed himself to be declared emperor. This view was of no importance, seeing that all parties in the country had for several months affirmed loyal allegiance to him, should he become the president. Knowing the popular wish, General Li Yuan-hung allowed himself to be declared president. Here, then, was the second unifying factor.

The president favored the provisional constitution, not yet fully ratified when the parliament was dissolved in 1913. He was willing to make this the law on which to begin anew. He also favored the reassembling of the old parliament. Premier Tuan at first was in favor of the new revised constitution, ratified by the National Council in 1914, thus making no break in the law of the land. He soon found that this view was not popular, and so, for the sake of peace, he fell in with the wishes of President Li. A mandate was issued reverting to the provisional constitution, and calling upon all members of the two houses of parliament to reassemble in Peking. This was done in the summer. Here, then, was another unifying factor, China had a parliament and a constitution from which to make a start.

During these few months the revolt in the provinces has come to an end. Insignificant friction has now and then occurred, first between the premier and the president as to their respective powers, between the cabinet and parliament as to the ones to become cabinet ministers, and between the premier and one of his cabinet ministers. It may be that a new cabinet will be formed. It is still clear, and a matter of gratitude, that the president has succeeded in being such a unifying factor between all elements in the government. The premier has not succeeded so well, but the services he has rendered the last few months, since the demise of President Yuan, deserve the appreciation of his countrymen. Parliament, also, has done much better than before. The provincial authorities are working hard in public interests.

The habit has prevailed through our generation to look

through blue glasses on everything Chinese. There have been more pessimists than optimists in China, both among Chinese and foreigners. Melancholia has banished hopefulness. One's thought dwells on imperfections, and overlooks that which is good and excellent, and of good report. One talks of coming dangers, and neglects the present duty. One blames another, and ceases to do anything one's self. The dreams are of earthquakes, epidemics, murder and devastation; there are no visions of delectable mountains, calm waters, or gentle zephyrs. Everything is "going to the dogs;" there are no doves of peace returning to our windows.

All this is a bad habit. It hampers alacrity in good deeds. True reform is deadened. There is no news for a big struggle. There is no upward look to the Father of Lights. Goodness naturally, under such circumstances, is left to stagnate.

Even on the restoration of the republic, with a man like President Li Yuan-hung on the bridge of the ship of state, the old pessimism dominates the average student of Chinese politics. "Are things any better?" and before you have a chance to reply, the questioner answers for himself: "There is no chance for China." We only wonder what all these critics, grumblers, snarlers, dyspeptics, really want. Before, they were complaining of Yuan Shih-kai; now they get no comfort in Li Yuan-hung. Before, they lamented the plot of the monarchists: today they fear for the republic, even in its second trial. There are some people, foreigners as well as Chinese, who seem never to be satisfied, never to be hopeful, never to be truly prayerful, concerning anything Chinese.

If after all China is to be doomed, she will be doomed by the excess of methods of force applied by one or more outside nations. Should this happen, the outlook for the earth is bad. Humanity as grouped in nations, with "bounds of habitation," will not come naturally, if it comes at all. Force, militarism in its worst phases, will rule, and not righteousness and reason. Is this to be the outcome of the cataclysm in Europe? Are the neutral nations to learn nothing good from this war? Will those

at war be ever sick of war, or will they have an incurable appetite for more and more of blood?

We personally place ourselves on the side of hope. We will not despair of China until she actually breathes her last.

II. AMERICA'S LOANS TO CHINA

China has been seeking loans from abroad for one of two purposes, administrative or industrial. As to the former I have always urged the Chinese to be on their guard, lest one or more foreign powers use such loans for political purposes. I have urged the Chinese to meet their own administrative expense. Should a small loan be made from a friendly nation like the United States there could be no objection, so far as China is concerned. It is, however, to be expected that other nationals will scoff at the idea that only a loan from American bankers for administrative purposes is safe for China. Should the Chinese government find it too difficult to resist the ridicule of other great powers for showing confidence in the United States, then we revert to our other counsel, namely, take no loan from any foreign country for administrative purposes.

China is now concerned with the proposition, and contract, too, of a loan or loans from Americans for industrial purposes. One of those loans, more a matter of charity than of speculation, and favored by the American Red Cross Society, is to be used for the conservation of the Huai Ho, and the opening of the Grand Canal from where boats now pass in North Kiangsu to the Wei River in North Shantung. Another loan is for building new lines of railway.

It now appears that the Entente Powers, notwithstanding help rendered them in time of war, are objecting to these loans. The objections, moreover, are made to the Chinese government and not to the Government at Washington, China is more subject to pressure, warnings, and threats, than is the United States. To attack at the place of "least resistance" is good tactics. The American government, however, should not leave the Chinese government to fight this battle of concessions all alone. The American govern-

ment, under direction of President Wilson, may object to guaranteeing American bankers in a loan to China, but they cannot stand aside, when other governments diplomatically interfere in a business transaction between American bankers and the Chinese government.

One rumor has been set afloat by interested parties that a portion of the railway loan was to be set apart for administrative purposes. This was the way a portion of the France-Belgian loan for building the line from Haichow to Lanchow was diverted. It is authoritatively announced that this rumor is false.

The *Peking Gazette* in support of "a pure piece of contracting work" gives this information: "We are happy to say that in this view not only does England concur, but also the French and Russian governments." We on our part would be happy to know that these governments were presenting no opposition to such "a pure piece of contracting work," but other information leads us to mistrust any friendly profession to Americans made by these three or all of the Entente Powers.

It might be supposed that in return for favors received from Americans, in carrying on war, through guidance of American bankers, the Entente Powers, inclusive of Japan, would reciprocate by helping Americans, under guidance of the same American bankers, to make a few investments in China. Whether profitable or not to American investors, they cannot but prove profitable to China.

Some weeks ago the Japanese government entered protest to the proposed salvation of the old Grand Canal through American skill and generosity, merely because all money needed for industrial works in Shantung must first be sought at the hands of Germany. We only notice that Japan takes it for granted that all privileges promised to Germany must now, before the terms for terminating the war are agreed upon, be taken over by Japan. The *North China Daily News* is right this once, as well as very kind, in thinking that for such a charitable undertaking Japan should not hinder America.

With reference to the railway loan to China from Ameri-

can financiers, the *Eastern News Agency* informs us authoritatively that "the Japanese government has demanded explanations from the government." The implication is that at least during the period of the war all matters affecting the Entente Powers, particularly Russia and England, are placed under the watchful care of Japan for safe protection. If the United States had by this time actually joined the Entente, as China is asked to do, there would be smooth working in all these matters of free competition, but seeing that the United States, as we hope also China, has decided to remain neutral, some difference must be expressed in concessions made by China to any Entente Power and those to a neutral country like the United States. For this reason, but for no other, Japan is in duty bound to "demand explanation." Of course it is much easier to demand it of China.

Russia also sends in a protest, according to the *Eastern News Agency*. The Chinese press is also full of particulars as to this sudden opposition. The line proposed from Fengchen to Lanchow, running along the border of Inner Mongolia, is regarded by Russia as against a previous agreement between China and Russia. The agreement being secret is not binding. Furthermore, Russia has no prior rights in all North China, as well as in North Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. The *North China Daily News* hopes that as Americans are supplying at good rates ammunition to Russia, and as Russian finances are rather bad, Russia will not be too hard on either America or China over this portion of the railway concessions. The surest way to bring this about is for China and the United States to make treaties of alliance with Russia for "Preserving the peace of the Far East," and also openly, and free from all cant, become another ally to the Entente Powers.

France also objects. In this objection Belgium joins. The financiers of these two countries have already a railway concession for building a line from Lanchow to Haining in South Kiangsu. As it is not likely that this line can be built with French and Belgian capital within our genera-

tion, they might allow the Americans to go ahead on another line. The two lines, moreover, are not competitive, such as the lines from Hankow to Peking and from Nanking to Peking.

"Great Britain," so says the Japanese News Agency, "has also protested that the Hangchow-Wenchow line in Chekiang, and Hengchow-Nanning line in Hunan and Kuangsi infringe the rights of the British syndicates." Japan, being an old ally of England, ought to know what England is doing or is saying as to affairs Chinese. Surely, if Russia and Japan may be advised to be gentle to American financiers, England may be thus counselled. How far the line from Shanghai to Hangchow and thence to Ningpo is an English concession, we do not know. Originally the line was a Chinese business proposition. Anyway, new lines are not necessarily the sole right of England, merely because old lines are their right.

Probably Japan is objecting, too, for in the Twenty-one Demands there was a grand move to get railway and mining rights in Central China, thus making very solid the alliance of Great Britain and Japan.

"Thus," sums up the *Eastern News Agency*, "there are many complications in connection with the American loan." The complications are not as between America and China, but between America and her much trusted friends, Japan, Russia, France, Belgium, and "mother England."

As an American, I sincerely hope that this time American financiers will not only make a good start in helping the development of China, but will, with "the perseverance of the saints," hold on to a successful and creditable termination. The American financiers should with ease find the money, and the American government should with alacrity defend American rights against all outsiders, be they the Entente Powers or the Central Powers. In this case neither China nor the United States is being bothered by much protestation from Germany or Austria-Hungary.

III. JAPAN'S CLASH WITH CHINA

One transparent, but calamitous characteristic of the Chinese, in these late years more than in the former days of conservatism, is the quick way they get excited and enter protests over political matters, and then the quick way they let these matters drop. Some months ago, the government, the parliament, the press, the people, were deeply and rightly stirred by the aggravating conduct of the Japanese at Chengchiatun, followed by certain outrageous demands. Before any settlement was reached, the question of a Japanese loan to China succeeded in diverting attention to new Japanese mining privileges in Hunan and Nahui, or to a Japanese monopoly in the purchase of copper cash in North China. The employment of a Japanese general as military adviser also diverted attention. Chengchiatun has been forgotten, just as the nature and outcome of the Twenty-one Demands of 1915 have been forgotten. Just indignation in both cases was only for a moment. China's effort to resist the mighty power of Japan was of the nature of a spasm.

It is well to be reminded that the Chengchiatun case, like Group V of the series of demands, is still here. The Japanese minister is still knocking at the door, though no one hears the knock, or speaks about it, save the foreign office in Peking.

The Chengchiatun case can be easily, amicably, and justly settled, if the Japanese government will conform to the spirit of the demands accepted through pressure of an ultimatum, or to the subsequent treaties and exchange of notes defining Japan's new powers and rights on Chinese territory. China should hold Japan to the law, as it was forcibly worked out in 1915.

According to this new law, "certain suitable places" were to be opened in Eastern Inner Mongolia "in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners." This is a very different proposition from the assumption of Japan, that she can of her own initiative despatch a detachment of *Japanese soldiers* from the Manchurian Rail-

way zone, where they act as guard to the railway, to some town in Eastern Inner Mongolia. There is no law in support of such *military intrusion*. Still less has Japan, as one of the belligerents and not a neutral, any right to place her soldiers in any part of Chinese territory, save in the Railway zone or in Peking as Legation guard. A Japanese paper, the *Jiji* correctly says: "The Japanese railway guards are in Manchuria to guard the railways and the railway zone and for no other purpose."

This being the case, the burden for a clash between the troops of the two countries, away off at Chengchiatun, as well as at a number of other places outside the railway zone, rests not on China but on Japan.

It is also clear that Japan has no right to pre-judge as to who is the guilty party, Japanese soldiers or Chinese soldiers. There must first be an investigation, and, to give satisfaction to both sides, a joint investigation. Japan, however, renders a decision and affixes the guilt, before and without any such investigation. The new treaties fail to give Japan the power to render judgment on criminal cases in Eastern Inner Mongolia. There are provided mixed courts in South Manchuria, but Mongolia is treated as other parts of the interior of China. China has not yet handed over authority to any outside power.

There is thus no need for China to "apologize and pay compensation." The one to do so is Japan.

Making use of a prejudgment, of a snap judgment, Japan demands that she be allowed to station her police in the towns of both Mongolia and Manchuria and that Japanese military advisers be also employed. This is the echo of Group V. This is a new attempt to get what Japan failed to get in 1915. This is a sly move to go beyond the law as then defined. The settlement then reached reads: "Hereafter, if foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial, military, or police matters are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese may be employed first." We note, then (a) that as to the police there is only to be *advisor or instructor* on police matters, no Japanese police stationed in Chinese towns; (b) that any and all kinds of

advisors and instructors are for *South Manchuria*, not for Eastern Inner Mongolia; and (c) that if such are to be employed, Japanese are to have *first chance*, not that China is compelled to employ them, whether she wants to or not. Let Japan abide by her own treaty, forced upon China, rather than now exact more than the law prescribes.

A Japanese paper also reports that Japanese instructors shall be employed in Chinese military schools. This is playing the old game, after the game has closed. Apparently this reference is to the whole of China. Let us read again the clear and reasonable words of the Chinese government spoken through Mr. Lu Cheng Hsiang after the ultimatum of Japan in 1915:

In respect to the demand for the appointment of influential Japanese to be advisors and instructors in political, financial and military affairs, the policy of the Chinese government in regard to the appointment of advisors has been similar to that which has presumably guided the Japanese government in like circumstances, namely the selection of the best qualified men irrespective of their nationality. As an indication of this desire to avail itself of the services of eminent Japanese, one of the earliest appointments made to an advisorship was that of Dr. Ariga, while later on Dr. Hirai and Mr. Takii were appointed to the ministry of communications.

It was considered that the demand that Japanese should be appointed in the three most important administrative departments, as well as the demand for the joint control of China's police, and the demand for an engagement to purchase a fixed amount of arms and ammunition from Japan or to establish joint arsenals in China, so clearly involved the sovereignty of the republic that the Chinese government was unable even to consider them.

To bring this matter up again, is not the natural outcome of the Chengchiatun case, but of the demand forced on China to negotiate about them later on. The Chengchiatun case should stand by itself.

If Japan could only be persuaded to satisfy herself with commercial and industrial expansion all over China, and keep in check all political aspirations on Chinese territory or military interference, she would quickly win the confidence of the Chinese nation and confirm friendly and cordial relations.

IV. JAPAN'S NEW PREMIER AND CHINA

In everything which I have written concerning Japan's animus towards China, I have not been moved by thoughts of America. The relations between America and Japan are one thing, and between China and Japan quite another. Even if Japan should threaten war against America, I see no reason for surmising that Japan wished to wage war against China.

Neither have I been much moved by thoughts of Germany, though here I confess that when I think of Japan, I inevitably think of Germany. As between Japan and Germany, the thought that the former is asked to take the place of Germany in China, in order to relieve England of a lively competitor, has never carried with it a delicious flavor. For German influence in Shantung to be replaced by Japanese influence has a slight appearance of usurpation, effected at a time when Germany's hands were full elsewhere.

My thoughts, and my feelings, too, concerning Japan have been moved by an interest in China, the land of my adoption, if I may so call it.

The equilibrium of the influence of foreign powers in China was upset, when German influence was pushed out, and Japanese influence in one more place was pushed in.

It is just possible that in a persistent criticism of Japan, as of any country, one may go beyond the limits of fairness.

While, possibly, no foreign government, least of all the United States, has any right to complain of Japanese actions in China, anyone whose mind is centered solely on China's interests, as every Chinese should be, is in duty bound to complain very strongly of the way Japan has been acting for two years and more in relation to the rights and security of the people, who are attached to what these two years has been known as the Republic of China.

As between Japan and the United States or Japan and any European power, Japan may be accorded the preference as to special privileges on the Asiatic continent. In allowing her this preference, she cannot by any process of reasoning exclude from these countries the rights of equal op-

portunity which China, and even Japan herself, has under the seal of solemn treaties definitely safeguarded and guaranteed to them as much as to Japan. If the Chinese prefer the friendship of the Japanese to that of all kinds of Westerners, no sound objection can be offered. This is very different from the plot to eliminate any one Western country, whether Germany or the United States, or the whole combine of Western nations. To reach this result, a few treaties would need to be first abrogated.

The new premier of Japan, Count Terauchi, like the former premier, Marquis Okuma, cannot escape a summons before the supreme court of civilization. In this court the defendant is assumed innocent till proved guilty. I am willing to risk the opinion that Count Terauchi is a very kind and considerate man and will demean himself in a way to win the affections of the Chinese and the esteem of all the West. I have perfect right to hold this opinion, just as I have the right, and will take it, to pass a few criticisms, should his conduct and intent prove other than my first opinion, wish and hope.

All men in responsible positions are apt to be deceptive. What one will do under stress of storm cannot be determined by what one has done on a calm sea. "He who is faithful in the least, is faithful also in much," said the great Teacher. I have, however, known of quite a few most worthy characters in ordinary walks of life, but who lost their heads, and disarranged their moral furniture, when placed in the lime light. So, too, I have known a few who seemed to be of no account in the little country town, but who loomed up as heroes and men of genius, when put to the test by a nation's crisis.

The Marquis Okuma was one I looked up to with admiring eyes in past years, when he was in retirement and in the opposition, when he was the sage of Waseda and president of the Japan Peace Society, when he spoke many, many words of philosophic insight and high ethical aim, and when his criticisms of his nation's faults seemed in touch with the character of the international mind. When he became premier, one who played with politics to retain the

majority, and had the opportunity, "such as," in his own language, "might only come once in a thousand years," then it was that he passed through the bewildering shades of metempsychosis. When the war loomed in sight, the great pacifist, philosopher, sage and saint, telegraphed across the Pacific to a Christian periodical in the states, the *Independent*, and through that to all true believers, these words that sounded like a familiar message of love and gentleness: "As premier of Japan, I have stated and I now again state to the people of America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or other people of anything which they now possess." When the supreme court of civilization had gathered all the facts and listened to every witness, there was no longer the slightest chance of returning a verdict of "Not guilty." The innocent appearance of Marquis Okuma evaporated into thin air. And yet it is just possible that this veteran of many years, returned to the scholastic life of Waseda, will become his old self, a mentor to the conscience, such as it is, of the mighty Mikado's empire.

On the same theory, and a pretty good one it is, Count Terauchi will pleasantly disappoint men's expectations. He now stands forth as the exponent of militarism, not a glib talker of peace. He has been the strong hand to hold down little Korea. He has successfully crushed out all hope of independence among the Korean people. He is the man of the hour, Field Marshall Count Terauchi. Let China tremble as this man of energy and iron takes in hand the politics of Eastern Asia.

As Count Okuma turned out differently from what we all expected, and from what, probably, he himself expected, so by the same reasoning General Count Terauchi will be different from the expectations of such ordinary on-lookers as ourselves.

By the way of New York—for New York bankers were open to all manner of doubts—we are informed what Premier Terauchi's *future* policy is to be. "Japan did not intend," this is the surprising message, "to violate the

sovereignty of China or hamper the equal opportunities of interested nations. A supreme effort would be made to maintain faith with foreign powers, and to fulfill Japanese obligations under the British and Russian alliances."

Let us take him at his word. This man is not the kind to fool people with words of honey. He is strong, unflinching, daring, and determined. If he marks out a course of action, he will follow it to the end, in face of all hindrances, blandishments, and dreams. He is a man of action. He announces his future policy; he will strive for it, and, in so doing, will daringly do the right. This is Count Terauchi of the future.

Should this policy be observed, under the leadership of such a "mighty man of valor," with the whole military party behind him, Japan will not only win her case in the supreme court of civilization, but will forge ahead among all nations as the guardian of the rights of all peoples. Japan's glory will outshine the glorious achievements of a long, unbroken historic record.

This is really Japan's "opportunity of a thousand years." Should Count Terauchi have the sublime audacity to call back all her military guards from Chinese soil, to reverse Marquis Okuma's designs in possessing Port Arthur and Dalny, and magnanimously hand them back to China, as a precedent to England at Weihaiwei, to consent to allow Germany at the end of the war to regain her rights in Shantung, and to make it clear that Japan is in dead earnest to preserve for China *all* of China's territory, then Japan, under such an heroic leader, will find in China a loyal and grateful follower, and will be recognized as the leader of Asia, the protector of the down-trodden along all these shores.